INTRODUCTION
The revival of humanitarian law as a subject of study has been at least in part an outcropping of the work of the international criminal tribunals created in the 1990s. Therefore it is no surprise that the influence of those tribunals on international law has been commented upon considerably.
1 However, outside of scholarly speculations it has not been that easy to obtain clear evidence of how much influence those tribunals have had on customary law aside from their own decisions. 2 There are two ways in which the tribunals may have affected views of customary law, through their constituent treaties and their jurisprudence. Neither is free from complexity or controversy. The difficulty involved in attempting to perceive the manner in which judicial decisions influence, or become considered reflective of, custom has been commented upon by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who brought his usual sagacity to the subject, stating that '[t]he imperceptible process by which the judicial decision ceases to be an application of existing law and becomes a source of law for the future is almost a religious mystery into which it is unseemly to pry.' 3 The relationship between treaties and custom has also been the subject of much discussion, upon which there is no shortage of dispute both at the general level and on particular rules. is important, even for those sympathetic to the study, 13 to appraise the study as objectively as possible, even though the aims of the study are unquestionably meritorious. In order to do this, it is necessary to begin by setting the international legal scene, of the general approach to treaties, judicial decisions and customary law in international law. Owing to some of the comments which will be offered later, it is also necessary to engage in a short excursus on the role of academics in international law.
TREATIES AND CUSTOM
With the possible exception of the Tokyo IMT, the statutes of international criminal tribunals all find their basis in treaty law.
14 The London Charter of the Nuremberg IMT was a treaty. 15 The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, although promulgated by the Security Council, find their legal basis in Chapter VII and Article 25 of the UN Charter. 16 Although the Statutes are not, in themselves, treaties, they are sufficiently analogous to them (and have been treated as such by the Tribunals) 17 that for the purposes of this article they may be considered under that rubric. The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty, and the legal basis of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is a treaty between the UN and Sierra Leone. 18 Therefore it is apposite to digress for a moment into the relationship between treaties and custom. 13 Of which I consider myself to be one. Lest there be any misinterpretation of this piece, the compliments herein directed to the Study are not sops to professional courtesy, but a reflection of genuine admiration for the study, and the criticisms ought to be read against the background of my support for most of what the Study says, and its intentions in full. 14 Even in the case of the Tokyo IMT, its basis is probably treaty law, i.e. the instrument of surrender between Japan and the Allies. 15 1945 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279. 16 Prosecutor v Tadić, supra n.2, paras 28-40. 17 See, e.g. The three ways in which treaties may interplay with customary law are, as is well known, summed up in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case. 21 They are either that the treaty is drafted to reflect customary law at the time of its adoption, that the negotiating process crystallizes the customary rule, or that a treaty provision subsequently becomes accepted as reflecting custom. 22 The difficulty, of course, is not stating the general propositions in this manner, but in determining in when each applies, or if any apply at all.
Certain matters are tolerably clear however. One is that, as the ILA committee on the formation of customary law noted, there is no presumption that a treaty is reflective of customary international laws at the time of its conclusion. 23 There has been some support for the proposition that humanitarian law treaties are an exception to this. 24 When Richard Baxter, who is often cited as the fons et origio of this idea, canvassed the possibility it was only as a matter of lex ferenda. 25 Nonetheless, there is some evidence that in relation to humanitarian law the standards of proof in relation to customary law have been relaxed when compared to other areas of law, particularly by tribunals dealing with the matter.
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Even so, care must be taken with this argument, as a tendency to adopt the view that humanitarian law is customary without adequate proof is unlikely to convince skeptics of the accuracy of the result. There is no rule of international law that provides for a special status for humanitarian law in relation to the formation of customary law and it is a matter of evidence in any individual case whether or not a treaty rule represents the custom one.
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In relation to this, there are a number of factors that have a bearing on proof of the customary status of a treaty rule. The first of these is the extent to which the treaty was considered codificatory at the time of its creation. One piece of evidence that this is the case is the treaty itself stating that it is intended to be codificatory of pre-existing custom.
28 This is only evidence though; the statement itself may be incorrect (although the more States that ratify the treaty, the more States are estopped from denying the accuracy of the assertion). 28 See, e.g. ILA Report, supra n.22, p.44; Villiger, supra n.18, pp.232-236. 29 Baxter, 'Multilateral Treaties' supra n.19, pp.277-278. Equally, the fact that preambles are not binding has a bearing on the question in situations where the statement of a treaty's codificatory nature is made there, (Villiger, ibid., p.236) . And that is where the majority of such statements are made.
Care must be taken where the treaty 'suggest[s] that some (unidentified) conventional rules may be codificatory. These formulations, while in fact providing little enlightenment, at least rule out a presumption that the instrument as a whole constitutes progressive development'. 30 The next evidence relevant to determining customary status is the travaux préparatoires of the treaty. These may show that the intention of the parties was to codify customary international law in a particular provision, or perhaps even more generally. 31 This includes ILC Reports where they are relevant. The travaux can also provide evidence that a rule crystallized as customary at a conference.
In relation to a treaty rule which is progressive development of the law at the time of its promulgation, a later finding that it has become customary is perfectly possible. 32 However, this is not something which is 'lightly to have been regarded as having been attained'. 33 Nevertheless, this has certainly occurred, and some of the most notable examples have been in humanitarian law. 34 As with questions of whether a treaty rule is codificatory or if custom crystallised at a drafting conference (or before), questions of evidence are important here.
This should not be a surprise: The question whether a treaty rule has become reflective of customary law is a question of the presence or otherwise of State practice and opinio juris, in the same way as applies to the question of if any purported rule is one of customary law. 35 In some ways, it can be more difficult to appraise practice in relation to a norm which has a pre-existing treaty basis, as the practice of parties to the treaties inter se can be attributed to the existence of the treaty. 36 As a result, the practice of State parties to a treaty in relation to third-parties, and their response to that practice is very relevant in determining the customary status of a novel treaty rule. The statements of non-parties as to their views on the customary status of rules can also be very useful here. The existence of a treaty has, in the past, led States to set out their position as to whether or not the rules it contains are an accurate reflection of the custom. In humanitarian law, US views on Additional Protocol I are of particular note. 37 Turning back to later evidence, one frequently resorted to piece of evidence is the number of States that have ratified the relevant treaty. In some ways this is paradoxical, given that the greater the number of parties, the more practice can be referred to the treaty. 38 Similarly, the greater the claim of a treaty to customary status at the time of its adoption, the lesser the impetus for States to bother to ratify the convention, as it will not alter their obligations.
feeling that if a treaty is very broadly ratified, it represents the general expectations of those States.
40 That certainly appears to be the approach taken by international tribunals.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
As with the relationship between treaties and customary law, the status of judicial decisions as a source of law is a matter upon which the level of literature is particularly high. 41 Although judicial decisions are only mentioned as a subsidiary means for determining the law in Article 38 (1) 42 The concrete form of a judgment, alongside the fact that it is (or at least should be) attended by a reasoned opinion gives a judicial decision considerable weight in international law. 43 A quick perusal of the commentaries to the ILC Rules on State Responsibility shows that in practice this is the case. 44 One of the most accurate statements of the status of judicial decisions in international law comes from Oppenheim:
In the absence of anything approaching judicial precedent the common law doctrine of judicial precedent, decisions of international tribunals are not a direct source of law in international adjudications. In fact, however, they exercise considerable influence as an impartial and considered statement of the law by jurists of authority made in light of actual problems which arise before them…it is probable in view of the difficulties surrounding the codification of international law, international tribunals will in the future fulfill, inconspicuously but efficiently, a large part of the task of developing international law 45 40 Such a process appears to have occurred with respect to at least most of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 41 The literature is so strong that it is to be hoped that readers will forgive the rather heavy use of quotation in this section. For some of the best examples amongst this literature see, in particular, Lauterpacht, Development, supra n.3; Mohammed Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (Cambridge: CUP, 1995); Robert Y. Jennings, 'The Judiciary, National and International, and the Development of International Law ' (1996) Longman's, 9 th ed., 1992) p.41. The only caveat that may be entered is about the inconspicuous nature of some of some of the development of international law by some courts.
As Mohammed Shahabuddeen has noted, 46 despite the fact that a court decision cannot create law per se, by recognising the existence of a rule of customary international law a court decision may essentially act as the final stage of the crystallization of that customary rule. 47 As Sir Robert Jennings has explained though, there are limits to the role that international tribunals may take owing to their nature as law determining, rather than creating, agencies:
[J]udges, whether national or international, are not empowered to make new laws. Of course we all know that interpretation does, and indeed should, have a creative element in adapting rules to new situations and needs, and therefore also in developing it even to an extent that might be regarded as changing it. Nevertheless, the principle that judges are not empowered to make new law is a basic principle of the process of adjudication. Any modification and development must be seen to be within the parameters of permissible interpretation. For otherwise judges lose their ultimate source of authority. Litigating parties do not resort to judges because the are wise or statesmenlike-very often they are manifestly neither-but because they know the law. 48 Similarly, the two bitter interlocutors of the first half of the twentieth century in British academic international law, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Georg Schwarzenberger, despite their considerably differing methods, agreed on certain things. One of these was that the decisions of international tribunals were useful evidence of what customary law was, but, and this is a large caveat, this depended on the quality of the decision. Hence Lauterpacht, in The Development of International Law by the International Court said: the outcome of the general recognition of the persuasive force of judicial precedent has been the development of a comprehensive body of law which, in proportion to its intrinsic method, can be used not only as direct evidence of specific rules of law as understood by the court, but also as indicative of the method and the spirit in which the Court may be counted upon to approach similar cases [emphasis added]. 49 Schwarzenberger, on the other hand graded court decisions as evidence of international law on the basis of the extent to which the court was impartial, free from personal interest of the judges, had an international outlook and had high technical standards. Even within those courts which, like the ICJ, fulfilled the general criteria, Schwarzenberger believed in looking carefully at the standard of reasoning in cases. 50 As he said, 'it is probably not accidental that the least convincing statements on international law made by the International Court of Justice excel by a remarkable economy of argument'. Another word of caution also ought to be mentioned. Where a decision is quoted as evidence of customary law, care must be taken not to 'double-count' the practice in the decision and the decision itself. Cases are useful repositories of practice, and the views taken on them by international judges are entitled to respect. However, the two are, and ought to be separable.
As an aside, it ought to be noted at this point that the proof of evidence of customary international law is not apolitical. A heavy reliance on the jurisprudence of international tribunals can be seen as a deliberate counter-hegemonic strategy. 52 Ian Brownlie rightly made this clear in his 1995 Hague Academy Course on General International Law '[t]he hegemonial approach will necessarily favour the decisions of the Security Council, especially in the constellation of world politics. It will not tend to favour institutions like the International Court, which cannot be controlled by a small group of States'. 53 The relevance here of Iain Scobbie's comments hardly needs to be made express.
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ACADEMICS AND THE DETERMINATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although the focus of this piece is not the influence of academics on international law per se, owing to their practical importance in determining the relevant impact of treaties and judicial decisions on customary law it is worth mentioning their role. Academics frequently write on the question of whether a treaty provision is customary or not 55 and criticise the decisions of courts, particularly in relation to their assertions about customary law. 56 It is to say the least, unduly self-denying to fail to take account of such work, in particular when engaging in a task such as the Study's, which is to appraise the nature of customary law across such a broad spectrum of rules as humanitarian law encompasses.
Normally, the role of scholars in international law is at best a default one. 57 Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute treats the outpourings of the most highly qualified publicists as being a subsidiary means of determining the law. There are those who further subordinate the views of scholars to the other subsidiary means of determining the law, judicial decisions. 58 This is probably accurate, at least in relation to the extent to which a particular statement of law may be taken as authoritative. As Fitzmaurice made clear, the form of a decision and the attitude of parties to international litigation to decisions of tribunals make them of greater weight than the writings of jurists. Equally, judicial decisions often cite or rely on (sub silentio or otherwise) the views of academics. As it happens, this has particularly been the case in relation to humanitarian law through the international criminal tribunals. 59 Scholars have frequently engaged in detailed studies of customary law, and in doing so, provided evidence of how evidence of custom may be appraised, alongside critiquing claims of customary status by others. 60 Like case-law, in proportion to their technical standards, such studies are of use in assisting in the determination of custom, and indeed the Study itself, and its judicial reception, is evidence of this utility. 61 The vast majority of the literature in relation to the impact of scholars on international law deals with the possibility that it has a constructive function, i.e. that scholars will attempt to push the law forward to a position which they consider appropriate. 62 The constructive effect of scholarship can only be half of the story. As the extent to which a judicial decision's view on what amounts to custom may be considered acceptable relies (inter alia) upon the quality of the reasoning of that decision, critiques of that reasoning are particularly important. considerable effect on the reception of such decisions. The critical savaging that has attended some of the findings in the Yerodia case is a case in point.
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THE APPROACH OF THE STUDY TO THE TRIBUNALS
Bearing in mind the above, it is time (finally) to move on to the approach the study proclaims itself to take to the international tribunals, through their treaties and jurisprudence. The first port of call on this is the introduction to the Study which, quite rightly, seeks to explain its methodology. In relation to the impact of treaties on custom, the study gives a fairly brief explanation of the interrelationship of treaties and custom, with a rather heavy emphasis on the number of parties to treaties 64 (assumedly owing to the controversial nature of parts of Additional Protocol I). 65 Even though, as we will see, the study relies quite heavily at times on the Statutes of the ICTY and ICC in particular, the only time the study expressly deals with the normative impact of the Statutes of international criminal tribunals is in relation to the Rome Statute. Thus we are not told of the relevant normative value of the other Tribunals' Statutes at all. Given the extent to which they are relied upon, this is unfortunate, and indicative of one of the problems with the study-it is often silent on the weight given to particular evidences of custom, a point to which we will return.
As it happens, the ICTY Statute, owing to the intention of its drafters, is very good evidence of customary law. This is because the Secretary-General's Report on the ICTY, which is analogous to the travaux préparatiores of a treaty, makes clear that the intention in drafting the Statute was to stay within the bounds of customary law: 'the application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence to some but not all States to specific conventions does not arise'.
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The same is not necessarily the case in relation to the Rwanda Tribunal. The SecretaryGeneral was not involved in the drafting of the ICTR's statute, 67 and there are no analogues to travaux for it. The Secretary-General did report on the Statute, however, and gave some remarks which are relevant to the appraisal of its customary status. Commenting on the war crimes provisions in the Statute, the Secretary-General noted that by including Additional Protocol II in the jurisdiction of the ICTR, the drafters of the Statute (the US and New Zealand), had gone beyond customary law. 68 The Study, despite relying on the ICTR Statute, 69 at no point discusses this. This is not to say that its reliance on the Statute is necessarily wrong, but it is not sufficiently explained.
Finally, in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Secretary-General, who drafted the Statute of the Special Court (in negotiation with the Sierra Leonean government), clearly saw his mandate as limited to customary international law. As he said, again, In recognition of the principle of legality, in particular nullum crimen sine lege, and the prohibition on retroactive criminal legislation, the international crimes enumerated, are crimes considered to have had the character of customary international law at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. 70 This had specific effects. In his initial draft of the Statute, the Secretary-General included a very limited prohibition of the recruitment of child soldiers, on the basis that he was not convinced that the provision in the Rome Statute could have been considered customary in 1996. 71 Interestingly, the Security Council insisted that the Secretary-General replace his suggested provision with one which conformed to that in the Rome Statute, 72 'to conform it to the statement of the law existing in 1996 and currently accepted by the international community'. 73 It is very surprising that this is not mentioned by the study, particularly when it relies on the Statute of the Special Court as part of the evidence to establish that the conscription or enlistment of child soldiers has been prohibited by customary law. 74 To return to what the study actually says about the statutes of international criminal tribunals, the study limits itself to the statement that 'it is important to stress, though it is not repeated in the commentaries, that with regard to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, there was a 'general agreement that the definitions of crimes in the ICC Statute were to reflect existing customary international law, and not create new law''. 75 There are a number of points that need to be made in relation to this, which implies that the Study takes a rather broad-brush approach in its reliance on the Rome Statute. The statement is one about the intentions of the drafters at Rome, it does not say that the results of the conference lived up to this hope. It must be remembered that the Rome Statute was a product of compromise. The Rome Statute itself deals with the possibility that its definitions are not necessarily as broad as custom allows in Article 10 of the Statute. Article 10 reads '[n]othing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute'. The precise nature of Article 10 is a matter of considerable debate, 76 nonetheless it is, if nothing else a warning that the Rome Statute is not to be taken as anything more than a base-level of what customary law is. 77 Yet the commentary makes no reference to Article 10 of the Rome Statute.
Perhaps the best general comment about the normative value of the Rome Statute came from the Trial Chamber in the Furundžija case, which stated:
In many areas the Statute may be regarded as indicative of the legal views, i.e. opinio juris of a great number of States. Notwithstanding article 10 of the Statute, the purpose of which is to ensure that existing or developing law is not 'limited' or 'prejudiced' by the Statute's provisions, resort may be had cum grano salis to these provisions to help elucidate customary international law. Depending on the matter at issue, the Rome Statute may be taken to restate, reflect or clarify customary rules or crystallise them, whereas in some areas it creates new law or modifies existing law. At any event, the Rome Statute by and large may be taken as constituting an authoritative expression of the legal views of a great number of States. 78 As we will see, however, some of the most controversial parts of the substantive law contained in the Rome Statute appear to be adopted by the Study, which thus contains some formulations which are more limited than custom.
The final thing to note about the treatment of the Rome Statute is the Elements of Crimes adopted under Article 9 of the Rule Statute. 79 Article 9 reads: 'Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8'. The intention of the drafters of the Statute was not that these elements were to bind the Court, but to act in a persuasive fashion to guide the court. 80 The Study uses the Elements on a number of occasions, but at no time does the study explain the weight which is to be attached to the Elements. Again we see that the study is wanting when it comes to explaining the precise normative status of the documents it relies on.
Moving on to judicial decisions, the Study is quite explicit that it has sympathy for the decisions of the international criminal tribunals, saying that:
Although decisions of international courts are subsidiary sources of international law, they do not constitute State practice. This is because, unlike national courts, international courts are not State organs. Their decisions have, nevertheless, been included because a finding by an international court that a rule of customary international law exists constitutes persuasive evidence to that effect. In addition, because of the precedential value of their decisions international courts can also contribute to the emergence of a rule of customary international law by influencing the subsequent practice of States and international organisations.
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What is interesting, and perhaps concerning, about this is its omnibus nature, the jurisprudence of international tribunals is apparently considered, per se, 'persuasive evidence' of a customary rule without any reference to the quality of decisions by those Tribunals. 82 It is no secret that the quality of decisions between certain international criminal tribunals varies, 83 as indeed it does within those tribunals. The persuasive nature of an international decision does, and ought to, depend upon its quality. Given the controversy over customary law, the evidence used for it ought to be high quality, and care must be taken not to take court decisions simply as correct restatements of custom. The Study is correct to treat the Nuremberg IMT's decision that the Hague Regulations attached to Hague Convention IV of 1907 84 were customary as (now) uncontroversial. 85 It does also note, on the other hand, citing Nuremberg as an example, that '[i]t appears that international courts and tribunals on occasion conclude that a rule of customary international law exists when that rule is a desirable one for international peace and security or for the protection of the human person provided there is no important contrary opinio juris. ' 86 This appears to accept that tribunal decisions are not always defensible on traditional grounds. This, however, might be referable to what is implied by the latter part of the quote above, that after a time, many controversial determinations of customary international law by tribunals become normalised.
The influence of decisions on the study, however, is not entirely consistent. Responding to the criticism that the study does not deal with definitions of armed conflict and internationalisation of non-international conflicts, 87 one of the report's authors wrote to the critics explaining All that we could have done was to repeat the various provisions in treaty law…and possibly some dicta from case law of the ICTY. But we felt that this was not sufficiently exhaustive to make any statement. 88 This is a surprising statement, given that there is a rich jurisprudence from the ICTY on internationalisation of armed conflicts, 89 including at appellate level. 90 The matter cannot be considered to have only been tangentially raised in the ICTY. Even if it is the case that there is a strict ratio/obiter distinction in international law, 91 the issue of the applicability of the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, i.e. the nature of the armed conflict, was not an obiter issue. It was central to the conviction of, for example, Dusko Tadić on counts concerning Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions. It might also be noted that at least some of the ICTY's jurisprudence on this matter has had a considerable impact on international law. The definition of non-international armed conflict given in the Tadić interlocutory appeal was taken up almost verbatim in the Rome Statute.
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The disavowal of placing reliance on dicta from the Tribunals is also inconsistent with the treatment of such statements elsewhere in the Study. For example, the Study takes a very broad view of the customary law applicable to prohibited weapons in non-international armed conflicts. 93 It is likely that their bold approach here was partially underpinned by the statement of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić interlocutory appeal that Elementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it preposterous that the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts between themselves be allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals on their own territory. What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars cannot but be inadmissible in civil strife.
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The Study cites the paragraph (although not making clear how much weight it is expected to bear). 95 Yet Tadić was not accused of any weapons offences, thus the statement was unquestionably obiter. Indeed, so were a considerable proportion of the decision's determinations of what customary law applied in non-international armed conflict, which are also relied on in the Study.
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These comments on the general approach complete, it is worthwhile investigating some specific areas where the Study uses the statutes and practice of the international criminal tribunals. It ought to be noted though that although elements of the Study are subject to criticism, the majority of the considerable use made by the study of the tribunals is not problematic. Few, if any could criticise the reference to the Nuremberg IMT Charter, for example, for the proposition that murder is a war crime. 97 The majority (but not all by any means) of the uses of the Rome Statute are similarly uncontroversial. The examples chosen, however, represent some more general difficulties with the approach in the Study.
TAKING THE CASES TOO SERIOUSLY? THE LAW OF REPRISALS
At times the study is perhaps a little over-sanguine in relation to case-law, taking some decisions as having a greater authority than their reasoning merits. Jurisprudence ought not to be adopted uncritically. 98 As mentioned above, the persuasive value of case-law is directly related to its quality or reasoning. In the, admittedly controversial, case of reprisals, in particular, reprisals targeting the civilian population outside of occupied territory which are prohibited under Article 51(6) of Additional Protocol I, the study relies on a piece of obiter in one of the most controversial decisions of the ICTY, Prosecutor v Kupreškić. 99 In relation to rule 146, which entirely accurately states 'Belligerent reprisals against persons protected by the Geneva Conventions are prohibited' 100 the commentary concludes that
Because of existing contrary practice, albeit very limited, it is difficult to conclude that there has yet crystallised a customary rule specifically prohibiting reprisals against civilians during the conduct of hostilities. Nevertheless, it is also difficult to assert that a right to resort to such reprisals continues to exist on the strength of the practice of only a limited number of States, some of which is ambiguous. Hence, there appears, at a minimum, to exist a trend in favour of prohibiting such reprisals. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in its review of the Martić case in 1996 and in its judgement in the Kupreškić case in 2000, found that there was such a prohibition already in existence, based largely in the imperatives of humanity or public conscience. These are important indications, consistent with a substantial body of practice now condemning or outlawing such reprisals. Against this background, it is difficult to see those cases as contributing a 'trend'. The response of academics to the decision at least partially undermines the case's contribution to it. It might be noted, although owing to the timing of its publication meant that the Study could not take it into account, the UK Manual of Military Law is clear that the UK has taken the view that the decision in Kupreškić is, insofar as it relates to a customary prohibition on reprisals, simply wrong. 107 Failing to refer to the commentaries on the decisions, which directly impugned the reasoning and presaged, if not influenced, State responses, is unfortunate. It is quite possible that the Study did in fact take into account these critiques. After all, it is careful not to follow the Kupreškić decision slavishly (and that point should be reiterated, as it implies that the Study has not, in practice, always taken the general view the introduction suggests). If it did take those academic views into account, however, the Study ought to have made this clear. The second volume of Study contains a plethora of practice relied upon (and excerpts from cases), to show how the rules were justified. If other considerations, such as academic commentaries, were taken into account, then it is important to state this alongside the practice. 1326, 1337, 1353, 1387, 1539, 1993, 2006, 2035, 2187, 2204, 2278, 2387, 2408, 2509, 2532, 2544, 2560, 2579, 2587, 2638, 2661, 2686, 2712, 2720, 2730, 2747, 2770, 2831, 3085, 3104, 3204,) , 3382, 3392, 3420, 3451, 3469, 3478, 3487, 3498, 3993, 4077. It seems that this was (quite sensibly, given the title, Matheson's position as Deputy Legal Adviser to the US State Department and the absence of any caveat in the piece that he is speaking in a personal capacity), basically taken as a statement of US official views, rather than a judgment on its intrinsic academic merit. In a slightly ironic twist, one of the very few areas where academic commentaries are used in the Study is on the general conditions of lawful reprisals (Study Vol II, pp. 3328, 3336, 3337, 3346, 3374, (3505) (3506) where earlier works by Greenwood (Christopher Greenwood, 'The TAKING ROME TOO 
SERIOUSLY-SUPERIOR ORDERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
The Study appears to take the sometimes controversial parts of the Rome Statute at face value, ignoring the drafting history of those provisions, and ignoring academic commentary on those provisions and their customary or otherwise status. Three particular areas spring to mind on this: superior orders, the formulation of the offence of launching an attack with excessive collateral damage and (civilian) superior responsibility.
Superior Orders
To begin with superior orders, the Study, in rule 155, provides that 'Obeying a superior order does not relieve a subordinate of criminal responsibility if they subordinate knew or should have known that the act ordered was unlawful or should have known because the manifestly unlawful nature of the act.' It might be surprising, therefore that the explanation of the rule in the commentary begins by noting that the rule that superior orders are not a defence 'was set forth' in the Charter of the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs, and that the principle was not rejected in the drafting of the additional protocols. 109 This is entirely true, however, the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs Statutes did not contain any requirement that the order be manifestly unlawful. They excluded the defence completely. The statement in the Study is followed by the assertion that This mixes two very different sets of provisions. All the documents mentioned, other than the Rome Statute, provide that superior orders are not a defence per se, but the commentary gives the impression that they are ad idem on superior orders. They almost are. The only treaty mentioned which supports the rule they assert, rather than the rule that superior orders are not a defence at all, is the Rome Statute.
The finding would have been more nuanced had it referred to the considerable academic commentary that supports or casts doubt on the customary nature of Article 33 of the ICC Twilight of the Lwa of Belligerent Reprisals ' (1989) Statute. 111 Some of that academic commentary also deals with the case law (much of which is cited by the study), and explains it on the basis that it relates to generally applicable domestic laws rather than those specifically applicable to international crimes. 112 This is not to say that the rule as formulated in the study is necessarily wrong, the Study does cite practice in support of the rule, however, it is fair to say that much of this practice (from both before and after Rome) seems to have been filtered through the lens of Article 33 of the Rome Statute, whilst other practice relating to the tribunals (including the ICTY and SCSL, which were meant to state the customary rules) has been seemingly downgraded to a secondary status. As the Study has done this, it needs to explain why the unequivocal rejection of a superior orders defence was acceptable when the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL Statutes were being drafted, but customary law now provides for a wider defence.
Collateral Damage
To move ion from defences, it is worth looking at an offence which the Study seems to take its formulation, rather uncritically, from the Rome Statute. This is the war crime of excessive collateral damage. The customary rule, at least according to the ICTY (whose decisions on this subject are fairly well reasoned) is that the provisions in Additional Protocol I are customary which, as serious violations of humanitarian law, are criminal. 113 However, the Study's commentary to rule 156, expands upon the statement that 'serious violations of international humanitarian law constitute war crimes' 114 by averring that there is a war crime related to launching an attack that causes disproportionate damage, which is framed as follows: 115 launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected.'
The Study quite rightly notes that this wording is drawn from Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute. It also candidly points out that the framing of the Rome Statute on this matter is different to that of Additional Protocol I. 116 Article 85(3)(c) of Additional Protocol I prohibits [launching] an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated
The study does note that the word 'overall' as an adjective for concrete and 'direct military advantage' is missing from the rule, although it is present in the Rome Statute, but avers that the meaning is the same. This is possibly the case although the position is not absolutely clear, 117 and the interpretation of 'concrete and direct' is a matter of considerable controversy. 118 However, by pointing to one alteration, the Study passes over a far more controversial one. This is an addition to the rule over the formulation in AP I. The word 'clearly' is added as a qualifier to 'excessive'. The commentary to the rule does not explain the addition of this term, which only appears in the Rome Statute. The addition of the word was controversial in Rome. It was unprecedented and opposed by a number of States. 119 The addition of the term, which has had no effect on ICTY jurisprudence on the definition of the offence in customary international law, also has a negative impact on the rule. The term does not fulfill its ostensible purpose, which was to clarify the crime, but simply raises the threshold and introduces greater uncertainty into the law in this area. 120 This is interesting, given that here we have a treaty (API), which has been declared by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY to reflect custom on this point, being passed over in favour of the Rome Statute. Given that jurisprudence is considered persuasive by the Study, and the Rome Statute is thought a good reflection of custom, the Study needs to explain why one was chosen over another. Again, there is literature in the area that clarifies the customary statute of the Rome Statute accurately. 121 Engagement, or perhaps explicit engagement, with the travaux (such that there are), case-law and academic commentary on this provision is important and would perhaps have led to a different rule being formulated. It would at least have blunted Daniel Bethlehem's critiques that the Study deviates from treaty texts without explaining why, and fails to explain the 'weight' it puts on practice, which are applicable here.
war crimes', which seems both clear and simple, and to take the correct position on the question of whether or not a separate rule criminalising the violation (serious or not) is required. 134 However, in the commentary to the rule, the Study refers to consistent ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence, traceable basically to the Tadić appeal decision, to the effect that there must be a separate rule criminalising the violation for such a violation to amount to a war crime. 135 Leaving aside the fact, as the Study quite rightly notes, that earlier practice was not to this effect, 136 the study seems to have sympathy for the Tadić approach, by stating that Tadić et al do 'not exclude the possibility that a State may define under its national law other violations of international humanitarian law as war crimes. The consequences of so doing, however, remain internal and there is no internationalisation of the obligation to repress those crimes and no universal jurisdiction'. 137 However, if this is the case, the commentary has undermined the rule. Here we can see an over-reliance on ICTY jurisprudence without sufficient evaluation of the quality of the decisions being relied upon, 138 but this time with the superaddition of greater uncertainty as even to what the rule asserted to be customary is.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing is critical of the Study. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the critique is of aspects of how the Study, in limited cases, has relied (or not relied) on documents and cases without always taking into account their background or quality. A majority of its conclusions can be supported wholeheartedly. The critiques above are emphatically not that the Study consistently overstates custom, or even that it has a tendency to. Indeed, the majority of the above is implicitly based on the feeling that in relation to at least a small number of issues, it could have gone a little further without going beyond existing law.
The work of a critic is an easy one, especially when compared to that of an author. As a work of scholarship, the Study is a stunning piece of work. Against the background of the difficulty of establishing custom at all, the Study has gone a huge way towards setting out the position under custom, and by even setting down the rules, has provided both impetus for further study in the area and a basis for debate. 139 The simple fact that within the confines of
